IHP 604 Module 5 Discussion Example

Reviewed by Delia Ravenscroft, MSN, RN

This IHP 604 Module 5 Discussion sample asks whether paying for performance and publishing quality data actually improve care. It is written for SNHU IHP 604 (IHP-604), the MS Healthcare Administration course on healthcare quality and improvement. The writer, a composite quality manager at an 18-clinic medical group, has been offered a larger health plan bonus for diabetes control and a public scorecard listing each clinic's results. Mendelson and colleagues found that pay-for-performance programs produced modest gains in some care processes but little clear effect on health outcomes. Eijkenaar and colleagues found effects that were mixed and often small, with design details mattering. Fung and colleagues found public reporting spurred hospital improvement activity more than it changed patient choices. The post argues for accepting the bonus while guarding against its risks and asks classmates about unintended effects.

CourseIHP 604 Healthcare Quality and Improvement
ModuleModule 5
Paper typeMS Healthcare Administration discussion post on incentives and public reporting
LengthAbout 390 words, 3 pages
FormatAPA 7 student paper
SchoolSouthern New Hampshire University
ProgramMS Healthcare Administration
UpdatedSeptember 2026

Free sample paper for IHP 604 Module 5

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Module Five Discussion

A Bonus Can Point the Way but Cannot Do the Work

Our largest health plan has just proposed doubling the bonus we can earn for diabetes control, to about $2.2 million a year, and publishing a scorecard with each of our 18 clinics' results on its website. Our physician owners are enthusiastic about the money and nervous about the scorecard. Before we sign, I wanted to know what the evidence says about whether either one improves care.

What this page is doingThe writer describes the offer on the table.
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Mendelson et al. (2017) reviewed studies of pay-for-performance programs in U.S. hospitals and outpatient settings. They found low-strength evidence that outpatient programs improved some processes of care over two to three years, and little consistent evidence that any program improved patient health outcomes. Eijkenaar et al. (2013), reviewing earlier systematic reviews, reached a similar verdict: effects were mixed and generally modest, and they depended on design features such as the size of the incentive, whether it rewarded improvement or only reaching a threshold and whether the measures were ones clinicians saw as meaningful. They also noted reported unintended effects, including attention shifting away from unmeasured care and the risk that clinicians avoid patients who are harder to bring under control.

Public reporting has a different logic. Fung et al. (2008) reviewed the evidence that publishing performance data improves quality and found that it stimulated quality improvement activity at the hospital level, yet its effects on the effectiveness, safety and patient-centeredness of care were less clear, and consumers made little use of the data when choosing providers. In other words, a scorecard may change what our clinic leaders pay attention to more than it changes where patients go.

For our situation, this suggests three things. The bonus can focus attention and fund the care managers we need, but it will not by itself move A1c. The threshold design, 25% or lower, rewards clinics already close and offers nothing to those starting at 44%, so we should ask the plan to reward improvement as well. And the scorecard could push clinics to avoid or dismiss hard-to-reach patients, so we should insist on reporting results by language and insurance alongside the headline rate.

What this page is doingEvidence on incentives and reporting is applied to the offer.
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My recommendation is to accept both, but negotiate an improvement-based reward and add stratified reporting before signing. For classmates: have incentives in your organizations produced any unintended effects, and how were they noticed?

What this page is doingThe writer recommends conditions and asks classmates a question.
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References

Eijkenaar, F., Emmert, M., Scheppach, M., & Schöffski, O. (2013). Effects of pay for performance in health care: A systematic review of systematic reviews. Health Policy, 110(2-3), 115-130. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.healthpol.2013.01.008

Fung, C. H., Lim, Y.-W., Mattke, S., Damberg, C., & Shekelle, P. G. (2008). Systematic review: The evidence that publishing patient care performance data improves quality of care. Annals of Internal Medicine, 148(2), 111-123. https://doi.org/10.7326/0003-4819-148-2-200801150-00006

Mendelson, A., Kondo, K., Damberg, C., Low, A., Motúapuaka, M., Freeman, M., O'Neil, M., Relevo, R., & Kansagara, D. (2017). The effects of pay-for-performance programs on health, health care use, and processes of care: A systematic review. Annals of Internal Medicine, 166(5), 341-353. https://doi.org/10.7326/M16-1881

What the IHP 604 Module 5 instructions ask for

The Module 5 discussion in IHP 604 generally asks you to evaluate incentives such as pay for performance, value-based contracts or public reporting and their effect on quality. Keep the opening post near 400 words, cite a pair of systematic reviews or comparable studies in APA 7, then return by the second deadline to engage with peers. Summarize what the evidence shows, including unintended effects, and apply it to a real or realistic decision in your organization. Take a position with conditions, and close with a question that draws on classmates' experience with incentives. IHP 604 graders notice clean headings in IHP 604 papers. IHP 604 names and dates need checking before IHP 604 submission. IHP 604 prompts vary by term, so recheck IHP 604 directions.

How this IHP 604 Module 5 discussion example is built

Here a composite quality manager weighs a health plan's offer of a $2.2 million diabetes bonus and a public clinic scorecard. Mendelson and colleagues show modest process gains but little outcome effect from pay for performance, Eijkenaar and colleagues stress design and unintended effects and Fung and colleagues show public reporting spurs hospital activity more than patient choice. The writer recommends accepting both while negotiating an improvement-based reward and stratified reporting, then asks classmates about unintended effects. IHP 604 students can reuse this structure for IHP 604 work. IHP 604 claims here trace to cited IHP 604 sources. IHP 604 readers can adapt each section to IHP 604 data.

Where the IHP 604 Module 5 rubric puts the points

Discussion posts on incentives are commonly graded on accurate summary of evidence, attention to design features and unintended consequences, application to a concrete decision, a reasoned position, APA 7 and replies that extend the conversation. Stronger posts recognize that incentives and reporting work through different mechanisms and propose safeguards. Posts lose marks when they assume incentives work because they sound logical, ignore evidence of small effects or reply to classmates with agreement alone. IHP 604 marks favor careful formatting across IHP 604 sections. IHP 604 citations keep every IHP 604 argument credible. IHP 604 instructors weigh evidence heavily in IHP 604 grading. Posts that quote exact findings, such as the size of an effect, tend to stand out.

IHP 604 Module 5 help: the mistakes that cost points

Posts on this topic often treat pay for performance as either a cure or a failure, without looking at design details such as thresholds versus improvement rewards. Some also skip unintended consequences like avoiding hard-to-treat patients. Summarize what reviews actually find, apply the findings to a specific offer or program, propose safeguards and ask peers a concrete question. Share your organization's incentive arrangements and the IHP 604 prompt so the post reflects your context. IHP 604 drafts start well from a IHP 604 outline. IHP 604 feedback already received guides IHP 604 revisions. IHP 604 rubrics posted in Brightspace clarify IHP 604 expectations. Checking each claim against the review's own abstract prevents overstatement.

Get IHP 604 Module 5 written to your instructions

Share the IHP 604 Module 5 prompt and the incentive or reporting program you are weighing. The post will summarize the evidence, flag design issues and unintended effects and take a reasoned position with safeguards, within 24 to 48 hours, free the first time. The paper above is an original model document written by our desk, not a submitted student paper and not an official Southern New Hampshire University document.

More IHP 604 papers and related MS Healthcare Administration samples

IHP 604 Module 5 questions, answered

Where can I find a free IHP 604 Module 5 Discussion sample?

IHP 604 Module 5 is presented in full on this page as a quality manager's post weighing a pay-for-performance bonus and a public scorecard against the evidence.

Does pay for performance improve health outcomes?

Reviews find modest improvements in some care processes but little consistent evidence of better health outcomes.

Does public reporting change where patients go?

Evidence suggests consumers rarely use it; its main effect is prompting providers to start improvement work.

What are unintended effects of quality incentives?

Neglect of unmeasured care, gaming of data and avoidance of patients who are harder to bring to target.

What design features make incentives work better?

Rewarding improvement as well as thresholds, using meaningful measures and making the incentive large enough to matter.