ACC 691 Module 2 Revenue Schemes Assignment Example

Reviewed by Portia Lambrick, MBA

This ACC 691 Module 2 Revenue Schemes Assignment sample analyzes how two revenue schemes overstated a company's results and how they were found. SNHU ACC 691 (ACC-691) assigns this analysis to MS Accounting students in Module Two, focusing on revenue recognition fraud. At a composite Nasdaq-listed kitchen equipment maker in Wisconsin, managers recorded bill-and-hold sales that no customer had asked for and shipped excess product to dealers with side letters allowing returns. The assignment tests each scheme against the ASC 606 criteria, identifies the red flags and the evidence that exposed it, quantifies the overstatement of revenue and gross profit for the quarter and explains which controls failed.

CourseACC 691 Detection and Prevention of Fraudulent Financial Statements
ModuleModule 2
Paper typegraduate assignment analyzing revenue recognition fraud schemes
LengthAbout 1,090 words, 6 pages
FormatAPA 7 student paper
SchoolSouthern New Hampshire University
ProgramMS Accounting
UpdatedOctober 2026

Free sample paper for ACC 691 Module 2

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Analysis of Bill-and-Hold and Channel Stuffing Schemes, Fourth Quarter 2024

[Student Name]

Southern New Hampshire University

ACC 691: Detection and Prevention of Fraudulent Financial Statements

Module Two Assignment

[Instructor Name]

[Date]

The organization, setting and figures below are a composite written as a model document. No real employer, client, colleague or patient is described.

What this page is doingThe title names both schemes and the period.
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Analysis of Bill-and-Hold and Channel Stuffing Schemes, Fourth Quarter 2024

Introduction

In the fourth quarter of 2024, the company reported revenue of $168 million, meeting guidance. The later investigation found that two schemes added $27.4 million of revenue that should not have been recognized in that quarter. This assignment analyzes each under ASC 606 (Financial Accounting Standards Board, 2014), identifies the warning signs and evidence and quantifies the misstatement.

What this page is doingThe schemes are introduced.
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Scheme One: Bill-and-Hold Without a Customer Request

In the last week of December, the sales vice president directed that 410 ovens and fryers, with a sales value of $19 million, be invoiced to eight restaurant chains and held at the company's warehouse. Under ASC 606-10-55-83, a customer obtains control in a bill-and-hold arrangement only if four criteria are all met.

Bill-and-hold criteria applied

CriterionRequirementFactsMet?
Substantive reasonThe buyer itself asked to have the goods held, for a business reason of its ownRequests were drafted by sales staff in January and signed afterwardNo
Identified as the customer'sUnits segregated and tagged for the customerUnits stayed in general finished goodsNo
Ready for transferProduct complete and ready to ship130 units were still awaiting final assemblyNo
Cannot be redirectedSeller cannot use or sell to others95 units were later shipped to other customersNo

None of the criteria was met, so control had not passed and no revenue should have been recognized. The units remained the company's inventory.

What this page is doingEach criterion fails.
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Scheme Two: Dealer Loading Backed by Side Letters

During the final fortnight of December, the company shipped $14 million of equipment to its network of food service equipment dealers, about three times their normal monthly purchases. Invoices carried standard 30-day terms, but regional managers sent side letters by email extending payment to 180 days and allowing dealers to return unsold units. Under ASC 606, a right of return creates variable consideration: revenue is recognized only for what the company expects to retain, expected returns are carried as a refund liability, and is constrained if returns cannot be reasonably estimated. Dealers' historical sell-through, about 40 percent of such volume within six months, suggests expected returns of about 60 percent. At most $5.6 million of revenue should have been recognized, with a refund liability of $8.4 million.

What this page is doingRevenue should have been constrained.
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Quantifying the Misstatement

Fourth-quarter 2024 overstatement, in millions

ItemRevenueCost of salesGross profit
Bill-and-hold sales$19.0$12.9$6.1
Channel stuffing, unconstrained portion8.45.52.9
Total overstatement$27.4$18.4$9.0

Reported gross profit was overstated by $9.0 million, about 21 percent of the quarter's reported gross profit, and net income by about $6.8 million after tax. The overstatement reversed in part in early 2025, when 95 bill-and-hold units shipped to other customers and dealers returned $7.9 million of product, which managers then covered with the next quarter's schemes.

What this page is doingThe quarter's effects are measured.
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Red Flags

Several signs were visible at the time. Days sales outstanding rose from 46 to 71 days at year end, as receivables grew faster than revenue. Finished goods in the warehouse did not fall despite record shipments. Fourth-quarter revenue was 27 percent of the year's total, against a historical 24 percent. Returns in the first quarter of 2025 were three times normal. Dechow et al. (2011) found that misstatements in their sample of SEC enforcement cases frequently involved revenue and receivables, and that measures such as abnormal receivables growth help predict them.

None of these signs proved fraud on its own. A rise in receivables can follow a strong final month, and a fourth quarter can be heavy when a large customer finishes a program. What made the pattern telling was that the signs pointed the same way at once: receivables grew, inventory did not fall, gross margin on dealer sales held steady even though dealers were buying three times their usual volume, and the following quarter's returns spiked. An analyst comparing the fourth quarter with the same quarter of the two prior years would have seen that dealer revenue had nearly doubled while restaurant traffic in the industry was flat.

What this page is doingThe signs a reader could have seen.
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Who Knew and How It Was Hidden

The bill-and-hold sales were directed by the sales vice president with the CFO's knowledge; emails show the CFO asked for the "list of year-end holds" and the total needed to reach guidance. To make the sales look genuine, sales staff later drafted customer request letters and asked friendly purchasing managers at the chains to sign them in January, after the auditors' cutoff testing had begun. The channel stuffing was arranged by two regional managers who sent side letters from personal email accounts, and the extended terms were not entered in the order system, so the credit department's aging showed the receivables as current. Both schemes relied on keeping documents outside the systems that finance and the auditors reviewed.

What this page is doingConcealment is traced.
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Aggressive or Fraudulent?

Not every quarter-end push is fraud. Offering a modest discount to pull an order forward, with standard terms and no return rights, can be legitimate if the customer takes control. What makes these schemes fraudulent is the combination of facts: customers did not request the holds, terms were changed secretly, and documents were created after the fact to mislead. Each fact shows intent to record revenue the company knew had not been earned.

What this page is doingThe line is drawn.
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How the Schemes Were Exposed

A warehouse supervisor told internal audit that invoiced units were still on the floor. Internal audit traced the invoices to warehouse records, found the unsigned requests and identified units later shipped to other customers. Dealer confirmations sent by the external auditors, which asked about payment terms and return rights, produced two replies mentioning the side letters, and email searches found 31 more.

What this page is doingThe evidence is described.
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Control Failures

Bill-and-hold sales required no approval from finance and no checklist of the four criteria. Shipping and invoicing were not reconciled at quarter end. Regional managers could change terms without the credit department's approval, and no one monitored dealer inventory levels. Kieso et al. (2019) note that period-end cutoff and unusual terms are areas where controls must be strongest, and these were weakest. Three changes would have closed most of the gap: a finance sign-off on every bill-and-hold request with the four criteria documented, a quarter-end match of invoices to bills of lading, and a rule that any change to standard terms flows through the credit department and the contract file rather than a manager's inbox.

What this page is doingWhat should have stopped them.
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Conclusion

Both schemes violated specific ASC 606 requirements: bill-and-hold sales failed all four criteria, and channel stuffing ignored rights of return that should have constrained revenue. Together they overstated fourth-quarter revenue by $27.4 million and gross profit by $9.0 million.

What this page is doingThe analysis is summarized.
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References

Dechow, P. M., Ge, W., Larson, C. R., & Sloan, R. G. (2011). Predicting material accounting misstatements. Contemporary Accounting Research, 28(1), 17-82. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1911-3846.2010.01041.x

Financial Accounting Standards Board. (2014). Revenue from contracts with customers (Topic 606) (Accounting Standards Update No. 2014-09). Author.

Kieso, D. E., Weygandt, J. J., & Warfield, T. D. (2019). Intermediate accounting (17th ed.). Wiley.

What the ACC 691 Module 2 instructions ask for

The Module Two assignment in ACC 691 usually presents revenue schemes and asks you to analyze them: how each worked, which accounting requirements it violated, what red flags appeared, what evidence revealed it, how much it misstated and which controls failed. Plan to cite the specific ASC 606 provisions, such as the bill-and-hold criteria, the treatment of rights of return and variable consideration, or the contract existence criteria, and to quantify the effect on revenue and gross profit by period. Distinguish aggressive judgments from clear violations, since graders reward analysis that explains why a transaction fails a specific criterion. Explaining who knew and how the schemes were hidden completes the picture.

How this ACC 691 Module 2 revenue schemes assignment example is built

The paper analyzes $19 million of ovens recorded as bill-and-hold sales in the fourth quarter. None of the four ASC 606 criteria was met: customers had not requested the arrangement, the units were not segregated, many were not finished and some were later shipped to other customers. It analyzes $14 million shipped to dealers in the last two weeks of the quarter with 180-day terms and side letters allowing returns; under ASC 606, expected returns of about 60 percent should have constrained revenue to $5.6 million. Revenue was overstated by $27.4 million and gross profit by $9.0 million. Red flags included a jump in receivables, unusual terms and returns the next quarter, and the paper traces who directed each scheme and how it was concealed.

Where the ACC 691 Module 2 rubric puts the points

Rubrics for the revenue schemes assignment typically score the explanation of each scheme, the identification of violated requirements, red flags, the evidence that exposed the schemes, quantification, control failures and use of sources. Top papers test each scheme against the specific criteria, quantify the effect on revenue and gross profit, connect red flags to ratios and documents a reader could have seen, and identify the control that would have prevented each. Graders also reward distinguishing aggressive but acceptable practices from violations and explaining the concealment. Common deductions include describing schemes without the rule they broke, ignoring gross profit, treating all quarter-end shipments as fraud and omitting how the schemes were discovered.

ACC 691 Module 2 help: the mistakes that cost points

Revenue scheme papers most often slip by calling a practice fraudulent without showing which criterion it fails, which leaves the conclusion unsupported. A second weak spot is the measurement: channel stuffing does not always mean no revenue, because the standard allows revenue net of expected returns when they can be estimated. If your case involves round-tripping or fictitious customers, the contract existence and collectibility criteria become central. Build a table of each transaction type with the criteria across the top and a yes or no in each cell; the violations become obvious. Then note which documents a reviewer would have needed to see them.

Get ACC 691 Module 2 written to your instructions

Send the ACC 691 Module 2 assignment along with the scheme details. The paper will test each scheme against the revenue standard, identify red flags and evidence, quantify the misstatement and name the failed controls. Usually two days; the first one is on us. The paper above is an original model document written by our desk, not a submitted student paper and not an official Southern New Hampshire University document.

More ACC 691 papers and related MS Accounting samples

ACC 691 Module 2 questions, answered

Where can I find a free ACC 691 Module 2 Revenue Schemes sample?

This page includes a full ACC 691 Module 2 assignment testing bill-and-hold and channel stuffing schemes against ASC 606.

What are the bill-and-hold criteria under ASC 606?

The reason for the arrangement must be substantive, the product must be identified separately as the customer's, it must be finished and able to ship, and the seller must have no ability to keep it for itself or send it elsewhere.

What is channel stuffing?

Pushing far more product into dealers or distributors than they can resell, usually in the closing days of a period and sweetened with long payment dates or a promise to take goods back, so that sales land in the earlier quarter.

How should rights of return affect revenue?

Revenue is recognized for the amount the seller expects to retain, and expected returns are carried as a refund liability; if returns cannot be estimated, revenue is constrained.

Why are side letters a red flag?

Because they change the terms of a sale outside the normal contract and approval process, often granting rights that would prevent or reduce revenue recognition.